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costs while maintaining or improving quality.1-8 Large
purchasers of health services—health management
organizations (HMOs), managed care corporations,
and the federal and state governments—should have
Both regulatory and competitive solutions to thehealth cost crisis have been advocated. Proponents
of the latter believe that managed care and competitive
market forces will lead to a reduction of health care
Objective: Many health planners promote the use of competition to contain
cost and improve quality of care. Using a standard econometric model, we
examined the evidence for “value-based” cardiac surgery provider selection
in eastern Massachusetts, where there is significant competition and man-
aged care penetration. 
Methods: McFadden’s conditional logit model was used to study cardiac
surgery provider selection among 6952 patients and eight metropolitan
Boston hospitals in 1997. Hospital predictor variables included beds, cardiac
surgery case volume, objective clinical and financial performance, reputation
(percent out-of-state referrals, cardiac residency program), distance from
patient’s home to hospital, and historical referral patterns. Subgroup analy-
ses were performed for each major payer category. 
Results: Distance from patient’s home to hospital (odds ratio 0.90; P = .000)
and the historical referral pattern from each patient’s hometown (z = 45.305;
P = .000) were important predictors in all models. A cardiac surgery resi-
dency enhanced the probability of selection (odds ratio 5.25; P = .000), as
did percent out-of-state referrals (odds ratio 1.10; P = .001). Higher mortal-
ity rates were associated with decreased probability of selection (odds ratio
0.51; P = .027), but higher length of stay was paradoxically associated with
greater probability (odds ratio 1.72; P = .000). Total hospital costs were irrel-
evant (odds ratio 1.00; P = .179). When analyzed by payer subgroup,
Medicare patients appeared to select hospitals with both low mortality (odds
ratio 0.43; P = .176) and short length of stay (odds ratio 0.76; P = .213),
although the results did not achieve statistical significance. The commercial
managed care subgroup exhibited the least “value-based” behavior. The odds
ratio for length of stay was the highest of any group (odds ratio = 2.589; P =
.000) and there was a subset of hospitals for which higher mortality was
actually associated with greater likelihood of selection.
Conclusions: The observable determinants of cardiac surgery provider selec-
tion are related to hospital reputation, historical referral patterns, and patient
proximity, not objective clinical or cost performance. The paradoxic behav-
ior of commercial managed care probably results from unobserved choice
factors that are not primarily based on objective provider performance. 
(J Thorac Cardiovasc Surg 2000;120:978-89)
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sufficient numbers of patients under their direction to
aggressively negotiate prices and selectively refer
patients to high “value” (high quality, low cost) hos-
pitals. To mitigate the possibility that unregulated,
economic-based competition could jeopardize
quality9 or lead to an inappropriate proliferation of
lower performance programs,10 providers should also
have access to outcome databases. In a few states,
such as New York11,12 and Pennsylvania,13,14 health
care quality “report cards” have been provided direct-
ly to the general public. 
In reality, the process of choosing a health care
provider, especially for a tertiary service like cardiac
surgery, is complex and poorly understood.
Unanswered questions include the actual amount of
discretion available to patients and their physicians,
how that discretion is exercised, and specifically how
much weight is given to various patient and provider
factors that might affect choice. Patients in traditional
indemnity plans or Medicare have the greatest range
of options and presumably base their decision on con-
venience, personal experiences, reputation, perfor-
mance “report cards,” historical referral patterns, and
the recommendations of their physicians, friends, and
family. Patients in managed care relinquish some free-
dom of choice to secure lower rates, but in most mar-
kets, including Boston, they retain significant options
because most plans contract with multiple hospitals.
Finally, some large employers have negotiated exclu-
sive contracts with “centers of excellence” to provide
all cardiovascular services for their employees. In
such arrangements, the range of alternatives for the
individual is limited and may involve significant out-
of-pocket expense.
The purpose of our study was to investigate the deter-
minants of cardiac surgery provider choice in eastern
Massachusetts where there are eight competitive car-
diac surgery programs, as well as substantial HMO
penetration. We empirically analyzed the evidence for
“value-based” provider selection, which should favor
institutions with the best combination of objective
quality outcomes and low cost.1,4-6,12 An econometric
technique known as the conditional logit model is used
to discern the relative importance of convenience, his-
torical referral patterns, reputation, objective perfor-
mance, and cost efficiency. Models are estimated for
the entire patient population and then separately for
various payers. 
Methods
Massachusetts has three major cardiac surgery market
regions: eastern Massachusetts, including metropolitan Boston;
Worcester; and Springfield. We use the cluster definition of
market area, based on regions in which there is little patient
ingress or egress,15-19 rather than using strict geopolitical
boundaries or fixed-distance radii. This approach makes
allowances for both population density and the presence of spe-
cialized referral centers for cardiac surgery. 
Within the eastern Massachusetts market, which forms the
basis for this study, eight hospitals clustered within a 15-mile
radius are licensed by the state to perform adult cardiac
surgery. These include Beth Israel Deaconess Medical
Center, Brigham & Women’s Hospital, St Elizabeth’s
Hospital, Lahey Clinic Medical Center, Massachusetts
General Hospital, Mount Auburn Hospital, New England
Medical Center, and Boston Medical Center (randomly
assigned letters A-H). They represent a broad spectrum of
size, cardiac surgery volume, and academic involvement. All
are not-for-profit ownership. 
Each Massachusetts hospital that performs cardiac surgery
is required to submit an annual report to the Massachusetts
Division of Health Care Finance and Policy. We obtained
these data, including basic demographic, clinical, and finan-
cial information, from Healthshare Technology, Inc (Acton,
Mass). Data were available for all patients who underwent
valve replacement or coronary artery bypass graft surgery
(CABG) (diagnosis related group [DRG] 104-107) during fis-
cal years (FY) 1994-1997. We used FY 1997 patients as the
study cohort and the aggregate FY 1994-1996 data as objec-
tive measures of hospital performance and cost efficiency.
Data were available for each of 6952 patients operated on
in FY 1997; 87 (1.24%) of an original 7039 patients were
excluded because of incomplete data. 




4. Acuity class (refined DRG [RDRG] classes 0-3)
5. Payer 
6. Hospital at which the operation was performed 
Hospital variables included the following (Table I):
1. Distance from the center of the patient’s zip code to the
center of the hospital’s zip code. Because of the population
density in the Boston area, the hospital zip code areas were
very small, ranging from two hospitals with a unique zip code
to a maximum zip code area of 2.79 square miles. Referring
physician zip code was not included in this analysis. 
2. Hospital size, measured by the number of 1997 licensed
acute care beds. 
3. Cardiac surgery program size, as measured by the aver-
age annual number of cardiac cases (DRG 104-107) per-
formed during 1994-1996. 
4. Objective clinical outcome data, including unadjusted
and adjusted (by RDRG, the only acuity index available in
Massachusetts) mortality and length of stay (a surrogate for
morbidity20 and for hospital process efficiency) for DRG
104-107 during 1994-1996. These were aggregate data for all
four cardiac DRGs averaged over the 3 years preceding the
study year, which we used as a summary measure of perfor-
mance. Cost effectiveness data included unadjusted and
adjusted average total cost for DRG 104-107 during 1994-
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1996. These costs were derived from charge data submitted to
government agencies by means of the cost-to-charge ratio.
5. Reputation indicators. These include percentage of out-
of-state referrals (excluding southern New Hampshire
because it is within the primary market area), which has been
widely used in previous choice models as a measure of a hos-
pital reputation, and the presence of an approved cardiotho-
racic residency program, which has also been used along
with medical school affiliation as a positive reputation mark-
er.15,16 Initially, we also used two popular consumer rankings
from US News and World Report and Boston Magazine.
However, we found both rankings to be highly correlated
with out-of-state referrals and cardiothoracic residency pro-
gram, and they were therefore not used in the final model. 
6. Historical market share, which represents each hospi-
tal’s 1994 market share for the town of origin of each patient
in the 1997 study group. 
To analyze the patient’s choice of provider, we used
McFadden’s conditional logit model.19,21-25 This incorporates
individual patient variables (RDRG, age, and acuity level) that
might affect choice, as well as multiple characteristics of the
hospital chosen and of the alternate seven hospitals not chosen.
The model was estimated globally and then by payer subgroups
with the use of Stata statistical software (Stata Corporation,
College Station, Tex). Within each model, we controlled for
both patient and hospital characteristics as listed earlier. 
Both unadjusted and RDRG-adjusted clinical and financial
performance data were used in separate models, and the
results were compared. Separate models were also estimated
for operation with and without cardiac catheterization on the
same admission (DRG 104 + 106 vs DRG 105 + 107) and for
CABG and valve cases (DRG 106 + 107 vs DRG 104 + 105). 
We also tested the robustness of the results by estimating
the model with and without the historical market share vari-
able, which represents each hospital’s 1994 market share of
the hometown of each 1997 study patient. This acknowledges
that patient choice for health care services, including cardiac
surgery, is substantially influenced by the established referral
patterns of the primary care physicians. Lacking more specif-
ic information on such historical referral patterns, the histor-
ical market share variable was an attempt to control for that
effect. The overall model estimation in Table II is the result
without this variable, in order that this very powerful predic-
tor would not obscure other potentially significant factors. In
the “Results” section, we discuss the impact on the model
when this variable is included. 
In additional models, we also analyzed the impact on the
parameter estimates of eliminating the patients who came to
metropolitan Boston for heart surgery from either western
Massachusetts or southern New Hampshire, despite having a
cardiac surgery provider in their own community. These com-
munity hospitals were not included in the choice set of our
base model. Finally, we tested the sensitivity of the model to
choice set restriction (the Independence of Irrelevant
Alternatives assumption [IIA]—see appendix).
Because of insurance restrictions, particularly those per-
taining to managed care, we were concerned that not all eight
hospitals were available to all study patients. Accordingly, we
used 1997 managed care contract data from the
Massachusetts Hospital Association in an attempt to restrict
the choice set of hospitals available to each patient on the
basis of their managed care plan enrollment. In reality, the
majority of managed care patients had access to all eight hos-
pitals. For example, of the three dominant managed care
plans in eastern Massachusetts (Tufts, Harvard Pilgrim, and
Blue Cross HMO), Tufts and Blue Cross had contracts with
all eight hospitals, whereas Harvard Pilgrim had contracts
with seven of the eight. Similarly, we also found that all eight
institutions had contracts with multiple health plans. This
includes 12 contracts for institution B, 9 contracts for hospi-
tal D, 8 contracts for institutions A, C, E, and H, and 7 con-
tracts each for hospitals F and G. There may also have been
special contractual agreements between certain payers and
hospitals of which we were not aware and that are not explic-
itly included in our model. 
Results
Characteristics of the alternative hospitals are sum-
marized in Table I. Although the results for all hospitals
were in a generally acceptable range, there was a sub-
stantial spread of average clinical and financial out-
comes. For example, average adjusted mortality for




Hospital beds 435 190-819
Cardiac cases 869 347-1,463
Cardiac residency 5 Yes 3 No
DRG 104 (%) 15.6 8.4-19.9
DRG 105 (%) 14.8 8.4-19.5
DRG 106 (%) 33.7 24.0-55.5
DRG 107 (%) 36.0 27.6-42.2
Acuity class 0 (%) 6.9 4.4-13.2
Acuity class 1 (%) 17.5 12.3-26.5
Acuity class 2 (%) 43.6 40.6-47.1
Acuity class 3 (%) 31.9 24.7-35.7
Commercial indemnity (%) 12.5 6.6-17.1
Commercial managed care (%) 26.1 22.0-29.8
Managed Medicare (%) 5.4 0.0-13.7
Medicaid (%) 1.9 0.8-5.2
Medicare (%) 49.9 44.9-52.0
Other (%) 4.2 2.1-9.8
FY 1994-1996
Out-of-state referral (%) 6.55 2.5-14.9
Unadjusted mortality (%) 2.69 1.74-3.74
Adjusted mortality (%) 2.77 1.81-3.66
Unadjusted LOS (d) 10.9 9.0-12.5
Adjusted LOS (d) 11.1 9.4-12.5
Unadjusted total cost ($) 24,894 20,675-31,456
Adjusted total cost ($) 25,059 21,891-30,738
FY, Fiscal year; DRG, diagnosis related group; LOS, length of stay.
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DRG 104-107 in FY 1994-1996 varied from 1.81% to
3.66%, and average adjusted total cost varied from
$21,891 to $30,738. 
Model results by payer are presented in Table II. This
does not include an individual table for Managed
Medicare, Medicaid, and Other Insurer because the
results for these relatively small payer groups were too
unstable to be reliable. In the models presented in Table
II, the likelihood ratio tests were all statistically signif-
icant (P = .000). Although the pseudo-R2 values were
relatively low, this is not unusual for nonlinear models,
such as the conditional logit. For logit models, the
upper limit of R2 is always less than 1, and unlike lin-
ear models, R2 does not represent the proportion of
variability explained by the model.22,24,25 Even the
more appropriate pseudo-R2 (based on the likelihood
ratio) lacks intuitive meaning between its extreme val-
ues of 0 and 1, except that larger values generally indi-
cate better fit when comparing two models estimated
from the same data and having the same alternative
choices.25
In the overall model (see Table II), not including the
historical market share variable, distance from patient
to hospital was the most stable and consistent predictor
of choice (odds ratio [OR] 0.90; P = .000). A cardiac
surgery residency program significantly enhanced the
probability of selection (OR 5.25; P = .000), as did per-
cent out-of-state referrals (OR 1.10; P = .001). Higher
adjusted mortality rates led to decreased likelihood of
selection (OR 0.51; P = .027), but higher length of stay
was paradoxically associated with greater probability
(OR 1.72; P = .000). Adjusted total hospital costs had
no relationship to the probability of selection (OR 1.00;
P = .179), nor did hospital bed capacity (OR = 0.99; 
P = .000) or cardiac case volume (OR = 1.01; P = .000).
Use of unadjusted rather than acuity-adjusted (RDRG)
performance data (mortality, length of stay, and total
cost) did not substantially change any of these results.
Subgroup analysis by payer type revealed a prefer-
ence for hospitals with cardiac surgery residency pro-
grams (OR 15.64; P = .021) among patients with com-
mercial indemnity insurance. Among traditional
Medicare patients, there was a negative association
with both mortality (OR 0.43; P = .176) and length of
stay (OR 0.76; P = .213), the most intuitive results for
any payer subgroup. The failure to achieve statistical
significance is probably due to the limited variation in
these variables among the eight hospitals. There were
insufficient numbers of Medicare managed care
patients to estimate a separate, stable model.
Commercial managed care patients were much more
likely to be treated at teaching hospitals (OR = 35.22;
Table II. Model results by payer
Overall Commercial indemnity
Variable OR SE z P OR SE z P
Out-of-state referral (%) 1.096 0.030 3.325 .001 1.220 0.109 2.230 .026
Cardiac residency 5.249 1.887 4.612 .000 15.639 18.676 2.303 .021
Adjusted mortality 0.509 0.155 –2.211 .027 0.253 0.278 –1.253 .210
Adjusted LOS 1.718 0.167 5.551 .000 1.793 0.613 1.709 .088
Adjusted total cost 1.000 0.000 1.343 .179 1.000 0.000 0.573 .567
Distance 0.897 0.005 –19.981 .000 0.898 0.014 –7.044 .000
Hospital beds 0.990 0.002 –5.525 .000 0.989 0.006 –1.686 .092
Annual cardiac cases 1.006 0.001 4.002 .000 1.007 0.005 1.266 .206
Pseudo R2 = 0.0833 Pseudo R2 = 0.1457
Log likelihood P = .000 Log likelihood P = .000
Commercial managed care Non-managed Medicare
Variable OR SE z P OR SE z P
Out-of-state referral (%) 1.082 0.056 1.510 .131 1.144 0.070 2.192 .028
Cardiac residency 35.223 25.855 4.852 .000 1.948 1.546 0.840 .401
Adjusted mortality 3.264 2.008 1.924 .054 0.426 0.269 –1.353 .176
Adjusted LOS 2.589 0.501 4.913 .000 0.755 0.171 –1.245 .213
Adjusted total cost 1.000 0.000 –1.407 .160 1.000 0.000 –0.182 .856
Distance 0.897 0.010 –9.748 .000 0.894 0.007 –14.384 .000
Hospital beds 0.983 0.004 –4.602 .000 0.994 0.004 –1.446 .148
Annual cardiac cases 1.009 0.003 2.790 .005 1.003 0.003 1.051 .293
Pseudo R2 = 0.1044 Pseudo R2 = 0.0893
Log likelihood P = .000 Log likelihood P = .000
OR, Odds ratio; SE, standard error; z, coefficient/SE coefficient; LOS, length of stay.
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P = .000). However, they were paradoxically the only
payer group in which hospitals with both higher mor-
tality (OR 3.26; P = .054) and higher length of stay
(OR = 2.59; P = .000) were more likely to be chosen.
Possible reasons for this finding, including an apparent
segmentation of the hospital choice set, will be dis-
cussed subsequently. 
In the overall model, we included all patients having
heart surgery at the eight hospitals within the eastern
Massachusetts market area. This included about 2% of
patients from the other two market areas in
Massachusetts (Worcester and Springfield) and south-
ern New Hampshire, all of whom had cardiac surgery
programs available locally. We assumed that such
patients had already made the decision to leave their
local area and come to one of the eight metropolitan
Boston hospitals for their heart surgery, and thus we
felt justified in not including their local hospitals in our
model’s choice set. To ensure that our results were not
distorted by this assumption, we also estimated the
models excluding these few patients. The resulting
odds ratios and significance levels were almost identi-
cal to those of our original model. 
Separate analyses (available from the authors) for
valve (DRG 104 + 105) and CABG (DRG 106 + 107)
and for procedures with (DRG 104 + 106) or without
(DRG 105 + 107) cardiac catheterization on the same
admission yielded roughly comparable results to the
overall series; however, the z and P values were less
significant because of the smaller numbers of patients.
When the historical market share variables were added
to the model, the odds ratio for this variable was 1.04,
indicating a 4% increase in odds of hospital choice for
each 1% historical market share. Its high z value (z =
45.31, P = .000) dominated most other predictors,
raised the overall pseudo-R2 to 0.17, and accounted for
most of the variability in the model. Thus, the inertia of
historical referral patterns remains a potent predictor of
future provider selection.
We tested the sensitivity of the model to choice set
restriction (IIA assumption—see appendix) by ran-
domly eliminating hospitals and repeating the model
estimation. Intuitively, the IIA assumption implies that
eliminating any one of the hospitals from the choice set
should not significantly change a patient’s relative
choice of one remaining hospital versus another. In
other words, patients who would have chosen the elim-
inated hospital should distribute themselves among the
remaining hospitals equally such that the relative ratio
of one choice over another remains the same. The
results of the Hausman and McFadden27 specification
test (see appendix) suggest that the IIA assumption was
satisfied for all models except the commercial managed
care patients. For this sample, the test results suggest
that three hospitals in the choice set are close substi-
tutes to each other, but not to the rest of the hospitals.
When any one of these three hospitals is eliminated
from the choice set, then higher mortality rates are
associated with a lower likelihood of being chosen
among the remaining hospitals. In contrast, when any
of the other five hospitals is eliminated, higher mortal-
ity rates remain paradoxically associated with greater
likelihood of selection, as they are in the overall com-
mercial managed care model. These findings suggest
that there are nonrandom, unobserved factors that are
correlated among the choices, and a nested logit model
may be more appropriate.22,24,25 For example, although
the majority of health plans in our sample have con-
tracts with most of the eight hospitals, the policies of
specific patients may preferentially direct them to cer-
tain hospitals. Similarly, there may be unobserved
referral patterns among physician groups that contract
with managed care plans, and these may further limit
the actual range of options available to some patients.
Unfortunately, without access to such information, we
cannot identify the real causes of the observed pattern.
Further research should focus on determining these
sources of nonrandom behavior.
Discussion
The extent to which value-based provider selection
actually occurs in health care is dependent on the type
of service being provided and the local market envi-
ronment. Cardiac surgery is an interesting specialty to
examine because its high volume and cost have a sig-
nificant impact on total national health expenditures. In
a few regions, a single provider monopolizes cardiac
surgery because of government regulation, geographic
isolation, or low population density. At the other
extreme, some states, like California,29,30 have wit-
nessed an unregulated proliferation of heart programs.
In this somewhat unique market, the CABG procedure
is regarded almost as an undifferentiated commodity,
and there is significant competition based on price. In
neither of these extremes would we expect “value-ori-
ented” competition.
These exceptions notwithstanding, the cardiac
surgery market in Massachusetts and most other
regions is best described as an oligopoly, a type of
imperfect competition. A limited number of providers
compete on the basis of product differentiation (histor-
ical reputation), quality, convenience, historical reputa-
tion, personal recommendations, and cost. Considering
all patients from Massachusetts and southern New
Hampshire having heart surgery (DRG 104-107) in
eastern Massachusetts during 1994-1996, the four
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largest cardiac programs performed 66% of operations,
and the remaining four hospitals accounted for 34%.
The Hirschman-Herfindahl Index, which is the sum of
the squares of percent market share, has been used in
both industry and health care18,31 to measure competi-
tiveness and market concentration. Values close to
10,000 indicate a monopoly, values of 3,000 to 10,000
suggest noncompetitive markets, and values less than
500 indicate highly competitive markets.18 For the
eight hospitals in our study, we estimate the
Hirschman-Herfindahl Index for DRG 104-107 during
FY 1994-1996 as 1,439, which indicates moderate mar-
ket competitiveness. Finally, the metropolitan Boston
market is significantly affected by managed care as evi-
denced by its inclusion in stage 3 of the University
Health System Consortium classification.32
How do we ascertain the determinants of cardiac
surgery provider selection in this moderately competi-
tive market with advanced managed care penetration?
Early research on health care choice used simple mod-
els and focused on nonspecialty care, often in rural
areas. Hospital preference was found to be an inverse
function of travel distance or time from the patient’s
home (“distance decay”) and a direct function of hos-
pital size (“gravity model”). Such models may be most
relevant in rural settings where travel distances are sub-
stantial, and they would not necessarily describe con-
sumer behavior in metropolitan markets with multiple
hospitals in close proximity. They also do not account
for the willingness of patients to travel greater distances
to obtain demonstrably better tertiary care.33-37
In recent years, sophisticated econometric tech-
niques known as discrete or qualitative choice mod-
els19,21-25 have been used to analyze consumer behav-
ior in health care (see appendix). One of the most
important of these is the conditional logit model,
derived by McFadden21 from the random utility theory
of economics. Consumers are presumed to make
choices that maximize their perceived utility. In
McFadden’s model, the use of a particular alternative
to the consumer is a linear function of the observable
characteristics of the consumer and of the choice
alternatives plus a stochastic error term that takes into
account unobserved variations in the alternatives, for
example, consumer taste.21-25 We use the terms patient
choice, consumer choice, and decision maker in a
generic sense, recognizing that they represent some
aggregate function of the preferences of the patient,
referring physician, and insurer.19,38
Conditional logit models in health care have general-
ly substantiated the importance of convenience identi-
fied by the early “distance decay” and “gravity” models,
but they have also revealed other significant predictors
of choice, including specific diagnosis, urgency status,
hospital bed capacity and revenues, type of specialty
services offered, number of physicians in proximity to
the hospital who have staff privileges, the presence of
alternative subspecialty providers, and urban versus
suburban location.19,33,39-41 These studies did not focus
specifically on cardiac surgery.
Luft and associates15 developed a conditional logit
model using 1983 California data to determine
whether quality had an impact on hospital choice for
a number of different medical and surgical services
during the era preceding public release of outcome
data. Mortality rates and percentage of referrals from
out of state were used as direct and indirect measures
of quality for a variety of medical and surgical diag-
noses. For CABG, the probability of hospital selec-
tion was positively related to medical school affilia-
tion and percentage of out-of-state referrals and
negatively correlated with morbidity, mortality,
charges, and distance. Burns and Wholey16 per-
formed a similar study of six DRGs (not including
heart surgery) using a 1989 data set from the highly
competitive Phoenix market, 2 years after the initial
release of Medicare outcome data. The results were
generally comparable with those of the study by Luft
and associates,15 although the authors remarked how
little the publicly available outcome data appeared to
affect choice. Distance (convenience) explained most
of the choice variability in both of these studies.
In the only report that specifically focused on car-
diac surgery, Chernew, Scanlon, and Hayward38 stud-
ied the importance of insurance payer in selecting a
CABG provider. Unfortunately, this study was limited
to under-65, non-Medicare patients, and financial
information was not available. Distance remained one
of the strongest determinants of choice, but HMO
patients were more likely to travel farther for their
care. HMO patients appeared more likely to receive
care at lower mortality institutions that attracted a
higher percentage of out-of-state patients, but only
when Kaiser Foundation Health Plan patients were
included in the model.
Our study builds on these hospital choice studies and
addresses many of their deficiencies. It includes all four
major cardiac surgery DRGs rather than only CABG and
uses a modern data set from a market with advanced
managed care penetration. All payer and age groups were
included, and basic cost data were available. We con-
trolled for type of surgery, acuity level, and age because
these might influence choice. Finally, unlike previous
studies that used reputation as a measure of quality, we
separated reputation and objective performance vari-
ables because they may not necessarily correlate.
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Our findings do not support the thesis that managed
care corporations have directed patients to the best
“value” (low morbidity, mortality, and cost) institu-
tions.3,42,43 Medicare patients, who presumably
enjoyed the most unrestricted range of options,
appeared to make the most “rational” choices.
Indeed, there is some evidence that commercial man-
aged care patients could be more likely to be operat-
ed on at institutions with less favorable performance.
Cost was not a predictive factor in any of the models.
Distance from patient’s home to hospital, historical
referral patterns by town, and subjective reputation
variables far exceeded objective performance as pre-
dictors of choice. 
We believe there are a number of potential explana-
tions for these observations and that they are not unique
to eastern Massachusetts. First, there is a restrictive
flow of quality and price information to consumers,
referring physicians, and insurers throughout the health
care system.43 This significantly diminishes their abili-
ty to make informed, rational choices. Our study was
based on “public” data, but in actuality, the information
is only accessible to government officials, insurance
administrators, and researchers and not to the general
public or even the general medical community. It is
unclear how many decision makers have actually
accessed or used these data. The quality of currently
available information is also limited by the absence of
a cardiac surgery risk-adjustment algorithm. 
Second, consumers generally do not rely on objec-
tive ratings to make health care or nonhealth care deci-
sions,3,44 even when they are available. In a Kaiser
study reported by Blendon and associates,44 con-
sumers were much more likely to choose a hospital or
surgeon with whom they or their family were familiar
rather than a higher rated one. The authors compared
this with similar studies in nonhealth care consumer
behavior in which only 20% of individuals consult an
objective information source before making a pur-
chase. In Pennsylvania, where an objective perfor-
mance report card is available, fewer than 1% of
patients knew their provider’s correct rating and used
this knowledge in making a selection, whereas 66%
considered distance important in their decision.45 With
few exceptions,12 patients seem relatively uninflu-
enced by objective rating systems. 
The same disinterest apparently characterizes most
referring doctors, who should have more familiarity
with the interpretation of objective ratings. In a survey
of 450 New York cardiologists conducted by Hannan
and associates,11 94% found the New York report card
easy to read. However, only 7% believed the report had
“very much” captured performance differences among
surgeons, and 62% indicated that it had no impact on
their referral patterns. Schneider and Epstein13 found
that Pennsylvania cardiologists questioned the credibil-
ity of the quality report cards, and 87% of them report-
ed minimal or no impact on their referral patterns. 
Even large corporations with a significant stake in
obtaining high-value care for their employees have not
apparently used these rating systems optimally. In
Cleveland, an industry-supported health quality report
card did not result in a significant redirection of
patients to less well-known institutions with better out-
comes, nor did it appear to penalize hospitals with
poorer results.46
Reputation and “name recognition” appear much
more important than objective performance to most
decision makers. Such behavior perpetuates the histor-
ical status of certain institutions and hinders the emer-
gence of lesser-known institutions whose current per-
formance may be superior. This “reputation”
dominance was analyzed by Green and associates,47
with respect to the yearly ranking of hospitals in US
News and World Report. Leaders of academic health
centers acknowledge that reputation has economic
value as well, permitting them to charge somewhat
higher prices.32
Third, the nature and acuity of cardiac disease is not
conducive to reasoned decision making by patients.
Managed competition was initially conceived as con-
sumer choice of a global health benefits package at the
time of plan election, based on a thoughtful compari-
son of their benefits.2,3,7,8 This is not the situation
experienced by the typical patient facing heart surgery.
Most patients coming to cardiac surgery have been
admitted to a hospital for unstable angina or myocar-
dial infarction. After this initial hospital choice has
been made, often based on proximity, there is signifi-
cant inertia either to stay at that hospital for catheteri-
zation and surgery or to follow that hospital’s usual
referral patterns. Furthermore, patients are often
encouraged to undergo surgery as quickly as possible,
so that they have even less opportunity for reflective
decision making. In Pennsylvania, a national leader in
public dissemination of clinical outcome and cost
data, only 12% of patients were aware of the quality
report before surgery, only 1% knew their provider’s
correct rating and reported that it had influenced their
decision, and many thought that time constraints had
diminished the value of performance reports in their
decision making.45
Finally, different participants in the choice process
may have discordant priorities. Consumers have no
interest in cost because there is generally little co-pay-
ment. In a Pennsylvania study,45 only 2% of consumers
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reported that cost was a factor in provider selection.
Nearly 2 decades ago, Ginzberg48 observed “There is
little in recent experience to suggest that the consumer
is guided in the purchase of professional services . . .
primarily by considerations of price.” Patients may
actually view low cost unfavorably, believing that it
may reflect “cut-rate” care by that provider. 
Referring physicians are interested in cost only to the
extent that they are involved in risk sharing contracts,
which are as yet uncommon in cardiovascular services.
Otherwise, unless there are exclusive contractual
arrangements, they will presumably base their deci-
sions on historical referral patterns, their personal rela-
tionships and experiences with certain surgeons, and
patient preferences. 
Managed care insurers would be expected to seek
the lowest price provider within an acceptable range of
quality.49 Theoretically, they would therefore prefer
heart surgery programs with the lowest costs and
length of stay, since such institutions should be able to
offer the best pricing. In our study, managed care
insurers demonstrated no apparent interest in either
clinical outcome or cost. Does this behavior result
from unobserved, nonrandom factors, such as special
contractual arrangements? Selective contracting has
the potential to improve health care by directing
patients to the best value providers, but it may actual-
ly have an adverse effect, depending on the relative
weight given to volume, price, and quality.20
Unfavorable market segmentation in Florida may have
resulted from selective contracting by HMOs with low
price, low volume hospitals.42 An investigative report
in The Wall Street Journal49 found similar evidence
that some managed care companies chose cardiac
surgery providers exclusively on the basis of price, dis-
regarding higher priced programs with better clinical
outcomes. Interestingly, these observations were made
in Pennsylvania and New York, states that have led the
country in outcomes reporting. 
In some regions, including eastern Massachusetts, the
apparent paradoxic behavior of managed care insurers
may result from insufficient data or from inattention to
available data, rather than from excessive emphasis on
price. In the absence of high-quality outcome data, some
well-intentioned payers may simply choose to contract
with the historically “highest reputation” programs, even
if this status is not always substantiated by actual perfor-
mance. The results of our Massachusetts study demon-
strate the importance of reputation even in the commer-
cial managed care group where objective performance
and provider cost efficiency appeared to be ignored. 
All these concerns notwithstanding, it appears that
HMOs in much of the country have as yet been unable
to direct patients primarily on the basis of cost. In
Pennsylvania, only 4% of patients reported any pres-
sure by insurers with regard to choice of provider.45
Given the increasing governmental and media scrutiny
of HMOs, it will be even harder for insurers to use such
criteria for hospital selection in the future. 
Finally, it must also be acknowledged that optimal
behavior by commercial managed care payers may be
significantly affected by the non-HMO sector.43 Low
volume and presumably less effective programs persist
even in California because there is still a substantial
pool of Medicare non-HMO patients.30 Chernew,
Hayward, and Scanlon30 assert that major changes in
referral patterns will not occur in the absence of more
active direction of the Medicare population. 
Caveats 
1. Our study deals only with the observable determi-
nants of cardiac surgery provider selection. Much of
the variability in choice remains unexplained even by
this relatively sophisticated model, suggesting there are
other factors at least as important as our predictor vari-
ables. For example, we do not have access to special
referral or case pricing agreements, which may exist
between some payers and hospitals. The results of our
IIA tests suggest that such unobserved factors may play
a particularly important role in the commercial man-
aged care group. 
2. Our study uses administrative data and a generic
risk adjustment (RDRG). These are inferior to clini-
cal databases with cardiac surgery–specific risk
adjustment, and they do not reliably distinguish co-
morbidities from complications. However, such data
have been used widely in other large comparative
studies because of their general availability and may
perform better for CABG than for other services.38 In
our study, the results were comparable whether we
used adjusted or unadjusted data, and our model also
controlled for acuity. 
Furthermore, despite the inherent weaknesses of
RDRG-adjusted administrative data, they are the only
objective information available in Massachusetts. To
the extent that anyone has used comparative clinical or
financial outcomes to aid in the selection of a cardiac
surgery provider, the data in our study represent what
was publicly available in Massachusetts in 1997. 
3. Precise cost information is notoriously difficult to
obtain. However, our data are based on charge reports
submitted to the state and federal governments by law
and should represent each hospital’s best accounting
estimate. Conversion of charge data to costs by means
of the cost-to-charge ratio is a widely used, if not per-
fect, method. This is the only publicly available infor-
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mation on hospital costs in Massachusetts, and it thus
represents what any interested party would have used
for comparative analysis.
4. Since we did not subdivide the commercial man-
aged care sample by individual payer, it is possible that
the behavior of one or two dominant insurers could
have been largely responsible for the paradoxic behav-
ior observed in this group. Such heterogeneity of refer-
ral behavior among HMO insurers was observed in the
California study by Chernew, Hayward, and Scanlon.38 
5. Our objective performance measures were based
on 1994-1996 data for all patients at a given institu-
tion. If hospitals with higher overall mortality rates
had substantially better results in their commercial
managed care patient subgroups, and if such insurers
only monitored the results for their own patients, it
could help to explain their seemingly counterintuitive
behavior. 
6. Finally, interpretation of clinical performance dif-
ferences among Massachusetts hospitals is difficult
because of the generally high quality of services
offered and the limited variation in this measure.
Because of state regulations, Massachusetts has a more
homogeneous group of moderate- to high-volume car-
diac surgery providers than might be observed in other
areas of the country. Although cardiac surgery in east-
ern Massachusetts is “competitive” by the usual market
share criteria, the not-for-profit status of all hospitals in
our study and the academic environment in metropoli-
tan Boston may both mitigate the less desirable aspects
of competition seen in some other regions. 
Conclusion 
Selection of a cardiac surgery provider in
Massachusetts does not appear to be “value based.”
Hospital choice appears to be most significantly asso-
ciated with convenience, reputation, and historical
referral patterns, not with objective clinical or financial
performance. Given the unexplained variability in our
model and the paradoxic results observed for commer-
cial managed care, it is possible that unobserved refer-
ral practices by such payers may unfavorably distort
the choice process. Whatever the explanation for this
behavior, its impact on the health care system is signif-
icant because of the increasing market presence of
commercial managed care.
For competition to be more effective in health care,
we must improve the quality, credibility, timeliness,
and accessibility of outcome data to patients, physi-
cians, and health care administrators.3 If “value-based”
provider selection is a desirable goal, there must be
more effective incentives to encourage such behavior
among decision makers. 
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Appendix
The McFadden conditional logit model evaluates choice
as a function of the attributes of the decision maker, the
chosen alternative, and the nonchosen alternatives.21-25 A
related model, the multinomial logit, includes only the
attributes of the decision maker. In conditional logit mod-
els, qualitative dependent variables are related to predictor
variables derived from data on individuals (disaggregate)
rather than populations (aggregate). These dependent vari-
ables may be noncategoric (eg, the number of lawsuits filed
in a given period) or categoric, and the latter may be
unordered (eg, multiple dummy variables), ordered (eg,
income strata), or sequential (eg, levels of training or edu-
cation).22 Such models have been used widely in areas
such as consumer choice, job selection, rural-urban migra-
tion, transportation planning, housing location and type,
recidivism, and politics.21
Conditional logit models are mathematically identical to
conditional logistic regression models used in matched
case-control studies.26 Each subject in the conditional logit
model generates a stratum with m data entries consisting of
the 1 chosen alternative (in our study, the chosen hospital)
and m-1 nonchosen alternatives. These correspond to the 1
case and m-1 matched controls per stratum in a matched
case-control study. As in case-control logistic regression,
the maximum likelihood estimator is not the same as that
used for standard unconditional logistic regression but
rather is computationally equivalent to that used for the
Cox proportional hazards model. 
In the McFadden model, given m alternative choices, Xtj =
vector of values of the attributes of the jth choice as perceived
by the th individual, and zt = vector of characteristics of the
individual decision maker, then the probability Ptj that indi-
vidual t chooses the jth alternative is22
In this model, the odds ratios of any pair of alternatives are
independent of the other alternatives. That is, Pj/Pk remains
the same no matter what alternatives are included or exclud-
ed. This is called the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives
(IIA) assumption. Hausman and McFadden27 developed a test
for the validity of this assumption. This test statistic, after
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Dr David F. Torchiana (Nahant, Mass). I would like to com-
mend the Association for choosing to include this type of report
in this meeting, because the subject matter is timely and con-
troversial and it is important to all practicing surgeons. 
Dr Shahian and I both work in this eastern Massachusetts
market, and cardiac surgery in eastern Massachusetts has
some features that are typical of the rest of the country and
some features that are very atypical. I think that the atypical
features of the state have influenced the outcome of this
report in some ways. There is a state certificate-of-need
requirement, there have been no new cardiac surgery pro-
grams in the past 2 decades, and the eight programs that are
the subject of this report are all at nonprofit academic centers.
Furthermore, the three major health plans that overwhelm-
ingly dominate the marketplace are all nonprofit, and man-
aged Medicare has made relatively little inroad into the
Medicare market in Massachusetts. 
In the analysis that Dr Shahian has presented, front-sheet
data collected for coding and billing purposes in medical
records have been used to demonstrate that reputation, geog-
raphy, and historical referral patterns are the dominant deter-
minants of where patients go for heart surgery. Trying to fur-
ther characterize clinical and financial factors from such a
data set is a tenuous exercise, and I will not digress to name
all the reasons.
Most important, it is impossible to look at cost as a feature
of decision making from this kind of data set, because as Dr
Shahian mentioned, hospitals and health plans contract on the
basis of price, not cost, and the relationship between the two
in a competitive market may be wildly inconsistent. One of
the frequent apocryphal quotes that I have heard in contract-
ing meetings is the statement that what we lose on pricing we
will make up for in volume. One of the reasons that the fed-
eral government has been unsympathetic to academic centers
hurting from Medicare cuts under the balanced budget
amendment is the evidence that HMOs have succeeded in
extracting unsustainable pricing discounts from institutions
that are determined to maintain their market share. 
The evidence from Dr Shahian’s report is that patients with
managed care insurance are more likely to be directed to cen-
ters with higher mortality. It would be nice to think that this
is an anomaly related to the relative weakness and obscurity
of the Massachusetts outcome data, but I am afraid that it is
not. The only explanation for this observation is related to
pricing concessions. In New York State, where the outcomes
reporting is highly public and the risk adjustment model is
rigorous, exactly the same referral pattern exists. This was
reported in a recent issue of the Journal of the American
Medical Association in a study that I coauthored (JAMA
2000;283:1976-82). 
I have 3 questions for Dr Shahian. First, what is your expla-
nation for the reason managed care patients are referred more
often to high-risk centers? 
Second, how can a value-based, marketplace-centered sys-
tem deal with the problem of adverse selection and risk
avoidance? Is risk adjustment enough? 
Third, what are your views and aspirations for a statewide
reporting system for Massachusetts and how might this ratio-
nalize these types of decisions? 
Dr Shahian. Thank you very much, Dr Torchiana. I was
heartened to see your recent article in the Journal of the
American Medical Association with results that substantially
corroborated our own findings. 
Let me comment on 2 points you mentioned but did not
actually ask as questions. First, use of administrative data is
certainly imperfect, but for all practical purposes, that is the
only data set that was available in Massachusetts in 1997.
Anybody interested in looking at this sort of information
would have to have used this data set. Therefore, imperfect or
not, I think it is reasonable to use this information in our
model. 
With regard to the lack of correlation between cost and
price, I think your comments are correct. However, managed
care negotiators should theoretically be interested in seeking
out lower-cost institutions, because such cost-effective insti-
tutions would be able to offer them better pricing. Thus, I did
not expect cost to be completely irrelevant as a choice pre-
dictor, although that was our finding.
Now I will address your 3 questions. Why do I think this
model demonstrated referral to higher mortality institutions
in Massachusetts? First, even “higher mortality” institu-
tions in Massachusetts were functioning within a very
acceptable range of mortality. Second, I do not believe this
was intentional behavior on the part of commercial man-
aged care companies. I believe other factors had an effect,
factors that we did not include in the model, such as special
contractual arrangements, which resulted in these patients
being directed to hospitals that did not necessarily have the
lowest mortality. I am certainly not inferring causality or
intentional behavior.
How can we avoid the problem of adverse selection and the
direction of most high-risk patients to certain institutions? I
believe I was careful to qualify the purported desirability of
value-based selection. I think there are aspects of value-based
selection that we should continue to pursue, but there will
always be that group of patients for whom “value-based
selection” is not appropriate, such as those with a particular
problem that requires special expertise.
Finally, as Dr Torchiana has mentioned, the cardiac sur-
geons in Massachusetts have been working for the past year
to bring the Society of Thoracic Surgeons database to our
state so that we have a more credible source of risk-adjusted
data for research purposes, quality control, and the edifica-
tion of all the programs and surgeons in the state. 
Dr Richard J. Shemin (Boston, Mass). I share a great
interest in your paper. I practice in the same area that you do.
I assume the data come from an the administrative database.
Therefore, particularly in reference to mortality, what is a
measurement for quality, were the data risk-adjusted, or were
raw mortality statistics used? Clearly, only risk-adjusted data
would allow interinstitutional comparisons with proper statis-
tics to identify significant differences. The method of risk
adjustment is also critical to obtain valid data. This was an
interesting and thought-provoking report. The business of
used the RDRG as a risk-adjustment mechanism. This is
an imperfect database, but it is the best we have available
in Massachusetts.
In the data that Dr Torchiana’s group presented from New
York, the spread of mortality from high-risk to low-risk
groups was comparable with ours, ranging from 2.1% to
3.2% for the low- versus the high-mortality hospitals.
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“managed care” certainly differs from the principles of “man-
aged care.”
Dr Shahian. The range was from 1.8% to 3.7%. The
only risk-adjustment mechanism available in Massa-
chusetts is the RDRG, which is flawed in many ways and
does not separate comorbidities from complications.
However, our results were comparable whether or not we
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